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Summary of the project and its objectives
The UK is in a critical juncture with regard to the process of negotiations to leave the European 
Union. Important discussions are taking place which will shape the future relation between 
Britain and the EU. The economic analyses published on the issue have, so far, largely failed to 
grasp the attention of the general public. Most of the discussions about Brexit have focused 
at a national level and there has been very little evidence-based discussion at a local level. 
This project aims at stimulating a reflexive participatory research process involving citizens, 
policy-makers, business people and civil-society representatives. It introduces an innovative 
methodology that contextualises quantitative data through expert interviews and the analysis 
of local sources. The reports and discussion panels organised within the framework of the 
project seek to increase our understanding about the impact of Brexit at a local level.
This report contributes to the broader research project co-ordinated 
by the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE).
Understanding Brexit impacts at a local level 
Mansfield case study
This study focuses on the perceived impact of Brexit on British local authorities. Five local 
authority case studies have been selected: Mansfield, Pendle, Ceredigion, Southampton  
and Barnet.
MANSFIELD
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Executive summary
This report examines the likely impact of different 
Brexit scenarios on the economy of Mansfield through 
four channels: immigration, policies for local economic 
development, trade and inflation.
Mansfield was selected as a case study of a town that 
has undergone significant industrial restructuring during 
the last four decades, following the decline of traditional 
industries such as coal mining and textiles. Mansfield still 
faces acute challenges in terms of attracting high value-
added businesses and increasing the skills and earnings 
of the local population. 
The share of the Leave vote in the 2016 referendum in 
Mansfield was 70.9%, the seventh highest in 382 UK 
local authorities. This outcome can be partly understood 
in terms of some of the structural characteristics of 
the Mansfield economy in the post-coal mining period, 
including the spread in the area of a business model that 
has relied on low-skilled, low-paid agency labour, often 
from other EU countries.
Leaving the EU would not in itself provide a durable 
solution to the area’s long-term structural problems. On 
the contrary, Brexit may actually exacerbate some of the 
challenges that high value-added firms face in the area. 
In order to make the most out of the post-Brexit situation, 
this report recommends: 
1. that every effort be made to address the major skill 
shortage faced by firms in the Mansfield economy, in 
order to minimise the negative impact of the decrease 
in skilled foreign workers that may occur after Brexit; 
2. that EU funding for regional development be fully 
replaced by national development programmes, while 
also retaining the best characteristics of EU policies, 
such as continuity across time and the empowerment 
of local and regional stakeholders;
3. that any disturbance to the trade links between 
local companies and the EU be kept to a minimum, 
especially in sectors that are considered strategically 
important; 
4. and that should the prices of basic goods continue to 
increase due to Brexit, measures be put in place to 
minimise the impact on the most vulnerable. 
“I think in Mansfield, Brexit has become so toxic and so polarising, that politicians have 
become genuinely reluctant to mention it.”
“Because Brexit is so politicised, businesses are quite reticent to talk about Brexit and its 
impact publicly (…) It’s a kind of signature issue. People identify with one side or another.”
1	 The	epigraphs	above	are	excerpts	from	two	of	the	interviews	that	we	conducted	in	Mansfield.	On	the	emergence	of	entrenched	political	identities	linked	to	the	way	
in which people voted in the 2016 EU referendum, see also Hobolt S.B., Leeper T., and Tilley J. 2018. Emerging Brexit identities. In The UK in a Changing Europe (Ed.). 
Brexit and Public Opinion, pp. 18-20.
2 Department for Communities and Local Government. 2006. The Dynamics of Local Economies and Deprived Neighbourhoods, 187. Available at: http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120920045319/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/150913.pdf.  
3	 BBC	News.	2017.	Election	2017:	Why	did	Canterbury	and	Mansfield	switch	sides?	BBC News online. 9 June. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-40222242.	For	an	excellent	analysis	of	recent	political	developments	in	Mansfield,	see	also:	Chaffin	J.	2018.	Can	Jeremy	Corbyn	restore	Labour’s	working	
class	vote?	Financial Times. 3 June. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/5822e600-5f55-11e8-ad91-e01af256df68.  
The	report	draws	from	a	combination	of	sources,	including	field	
research	conducted	in	Mansfield	with	the	aim	of	identifying	the	
range	of	context-specific	channels	through	which	leaving	the	EU	is	
likely	to	influence	the	local	economy,	as	well	as	quantitative	impact	
assessments written at the LSE Centre for Economic Performance 
(CEP) and the City Region Economic and Development Institute 
(City REDI) of the University of Birmingham. 
The	aim	of	the	report	is	twofold:	to	increase	our	knowledge	and	
awareness	of	the	specific	types	of	impact	that	Brexit	is	likely	
to	have	on	the	local	economy	of	Mansfield;	and	to	encourage	
constructive,	evidence-based,	forward-looking	discussion	
about the issue at local level, overcoming the polarisation that 
many	of	our	interviewees	identified	as	being	the	dominant	
characteristic of many debates on Brexit at the moment.1 We 
have strived to achieve the latter by leaving on one side the 
question	of	whether	Brexit	was	a	good	or	bad	idea	in	the	first	
place, and by focusing instead on strategies to best manage 
the situation going forward. 
Engaging with the views of members of the local community 
has been crucial in the research process right from the start. 
This	report	draws	heavily	from	the	insights	that	were	kindly	
shared	by	five	representatives	of	the	local	business	community,	
three representatives of local authorities, one journalist and one 
professor, in the context of semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
conducted	in	Mansfield	(a	full	list	of	the	interviewees	can	be	
found in the Appendix on page 20). The report also draws 
from articles in local newspapers, from grey literature about 
Mansfield’s	economy	and	from	secondary	literature.
Mansfield	was	selected	as	a	case	study	of	a	town	that	has	
undergone	significant	industrial	restructuring	during	the	last	
four decades, following the gradual closure of 13 coal pits in 
the	broader	Mansfield	area,	which	employed	16,500	people	in	
1984, and the decline of other traditional industries, such as 
textiles and engineering.2	Mansfield	also	received	widespread	
attention in June 2017, when Labour lost its local parliamentary 
seat	for	the	first	time	since	1923.3 
After	providing	some	contextual	information	about	Mansfield	
and	the	2016	vote,	this	report	focuses	on	the	likely	effect	
of Brexit on the local economy through four channels: 
immigration, policies for local economic development, trade 
and inflation. The report argues that the Leave vote in the 
referendum	was	related	to	the	area’s	long-term	structural	
economic	problems.	However,	we	also	find	that	leaving	the	
EU	may	not	in	itself	provide	a	durable	solution	to	the	area’s	
long-term structural problems, and could even aggravate some 
of them. We identify distinct threats and opportunities that will 
arise	from	Brexit	in	relation	to	the	challenges	that	Mansfield’s	
economy faces, and present some recommendations for 
making	the	most	out	of	the	situation.
Introduction
This report examines the likely impact of different Brexit scenarios on the 
economy of Mansfield. 
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Local context
Mansfield is a local authority of 105,800 inhabitants in Nottinghamshire.4 
The majority of the local authority’s population live in the town of Mansfield, 
which is situated 20km north of Nottingham.
4 Data source: Annual Population Survey (APS). 2016.
Among	Mansfield’s	economic	assets	is	its	central	location	
between	several	‘powerhouses	of	national	productivity’:	
Sheffield	and	Leeds	to	the	north,	Manchester	and	Birmingham	
to the west and Nottingham and Leicester to the south.5 The 
economy	of	Mansfield	itself	is	highly	interlinked	with	that	of	the	
neighbouring	local	authority,	Ashfield,	and	people	in	the	towns	
of	Kirkby-in-Ashfield	and	Sutton-in-Ashfield	in	particular	‘look	to	
Mansfield	as	their	town	centre’.6 
For	most	of	the	twentieth	century,	Mansfield	was	one	of	
the major centres of coal mining in Nottinghamshire. The 
Mansfield	coalfield	was	important	not	only	for	the	number	of	
jobs it provided in the area, but also for its particularly high 
productivity,	which	was	reflected	in	comparatively	high	miners’	
wages.7 Most of the pits in the area were closed in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, but the Thoresby colliery, which 
was	the	last	pit	in	operation,	only	shut	down	in	2015.8 The 
decline of the textile industry in the area has been ‘similarly 
dramatic’,9 while the engineering sector also experienced a 
crisis	that	was	linked	to	the	closure	of	the	mines.
Since the decline of coal mining and some traditional 
manufacturing	industries,	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	Mansfield	has	
experienced	a	significant	increase	in	relatively	low	value-added,	
low-paid service sector employment. For example, many 
5	 Experian.	June	2009.	Ashfield and Mansfield: Economic Analysis Final Report, 39. Available at: https://www.ashfield.gov.uk/media/2320/p8-ashfield_and_mansfield_
economic_analysis.pdf.  
6 Interview with Andy Done-Johnson, until recently reporter at the Mansfield Chad,	conducted	on	25	May	2018;	the	close	link	between	the	local	economies	of	Mansfield	
and	Ashfield	was	also	mentioned	in	the	interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	CEO	of	Local	Enterprise	Partnership	for	Derby,	Derbyshire,	Nottingham	and	Nottinghamshire	
(D2N2	LEP),	conducted	on	25	May	2018.
7	 Howell	D.	2012.	Defiant	dominoes:	working	miners	and	the	1984-5	strike.	In	Jackson	B.	and	Saunders	B.	(Eds).	Making Thatcher’s Britain. Cambridge University Press, 
154;	Chaffin	2018.
8	 Chaffin	2018.
9 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, 187.
10	 Experian	2009,	18;	Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government	2006,	187.
11 D2N2 Local Enterprise Partnership. 2017. 2016/17 State of the D2N2 Economy, 34. Available at: http://www.d2n2lep.org/write/Documents/Reports/state-of-the-
economy/2016-17/2016-17_State_of_the_Economy_final.pdf. The data are from 2016. 
12  D2N2 Local Enterprise Partnership 2017, 34. The data are from 2016.
13	 Social	Mobility	Commission.	November	2017.	State	of	the	Nation	2017:	Social	Mobility	in	Great	Britain,	175.	The	social	mobility	index	measures	social	mobility	
prospects in particular areas based on 16 indicators related to educational attainment from the nursery to the higher education stage, and to opportunities that people 
have	in	their	working	lives	in	terms	of	the	quality	of	jobs,	pay	and	access	to	housing	(for	more	details,	see	pp.	157-158	of	the	report).	It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	
the	proportion	of	claimants	of	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions	benefits	is	also	higher	in	Mansfield	(15.5%)	than	the	regional	and	national	averages	(10.7%	and	11%	
respectively),	something	that	is	mainly	driven	by	the	higher	proportion	of	people	receiving	incapacity	benefits,	carers’	benefits	and	disability	benefits	in	Mansfield:	see	
Nomis	Official	Labour	Market	Statistics.	November	2016.	Available	at:	http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/reports/lmp/la/1946157166/printable.aspx. 
14	 See	also	Jennings	W.	October	2017.	Cities	and	towns:	The	2017	general	election	and	the	social	divisions	of	place:	Part	I.	New	Economics	Foundation.	Available	at:	
https://neweconomics.org/uploads/files/FINAL-CITIES-AND-TOWNS.pdf.  
new jobs were created in the wholesale, 
retail and repair sectors, as well as in 
comparatively low value-added business 
services such as labour recruitment and 
packaging.10 Today, the employment 
rate	in	Mansfield	is	close	to	the	national	
average. However, median annual earnings 
(£15,226)	are	very	low	compared	to	both	
the national average (£23,349) and the 
regional average in the East Midlands (£21,172).11 With only 
20%	of	the	working-age	population	qualified	at	the	NVQ	Level	
4	or	above,	compared	to	37.9%	at	national	level	and	31.3%	at	
the level of the East Midlands, low educational attainment in 
Mansfield	is	both	a	cause	and	a	reflection	of	the	low-skill,	low-
pay character of many jobs.12 These socioeconomic attributes 
are	reflected	in	Mansfield’s	very	low	ranking	in	the	social	
mobility	index	compiled	by	the	UK	government’s	Social	Mobility	
Commission:	out	of	324	English	local	authorities,	Mansfield	and	
the	two	neighbouring	local	authorities	of	Ashfield	and	Newark	
& Sherwood occupy three of the ten bottom places of the index, 
ranked	315,	317	and	323	respectively.13 These developments 
contribute in a powerful way to a sense of being left behind 
by	the	UK’s	current	economic	model,	which	relies	heavily	on	
linkages	with	global	markets14.
20%
of the working 
population 
qualified at NVQ 
level 4 or above
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In	terms	of	ethnic	composition,	87%	of	Mansfield’s	
population is white UK-born, which is above the UK average 
of	80%.	As	illustrated	in	Figure	2,	the	white	non	UK-born	
constitute a relatively large share among the rest of the 
population, while the total share of the non-white population 
is	significantly	below	the	UK	average	(7%	compared	to	a	UK	
average	of	13.5%).15	20	years	ago,	Mansfield	was	even	more	
homogeneous, as the immigration of Eastern Europeans 
particularly	in	the	Mansfield	area	is	a	relatively	recent	
phenomenon:	‘Mansfield	by	its	character	is	actually	quite	an	
isolated	community.	It	is	indigenously	white	working-class,	and	
for	a	very	long	time	it	really	didn’t	have	much	experience	of	
people	moving	to	the	area.’16
15 Data source: Annual Population Survey (APS). 2016.
16	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
17 Data source: Electoral Commission.
18	 Jennings	2017,	pp.	5-6.
Mansfield	voted	70.9%	Leave	in	the	2016	EU	referendum,	which	
is the seventh highest percentage in favour of Leave out of 382 
UK local authorities.17 A year later, in the 2017 general election, 
the	Conservative	candidate	Ben	Bradley	won	the	Mansfield	
seat, which had been held by Labour for almost a hundred 
years,	with	a	difference	of	1,057	votes	(2.1	percentage	points).	
This victory followed the electoral decimation of UKIP and a 
swing	of	13.4%	from	Labour	to	the	Conservatives	compared	
to	the	2015	election,	at	the	same	time	when	in	England	as	a	
whole,	there	was	an	overall	swing	of	5.7%	in	favour	of	Labour.18
 Manufacturing – Textiles
 Manufacturing – Other
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 Mining
 Construction
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 White not UK born 6.2%
 Ethnic minority UK born 2%
 Ethnic minority not UK born 5%
Figure 2: Mansfield population by Ethnicity, June 2016.
Source: APS
Figure 1:  Level of employment in selected sectors in Mansfield, 1984-2015. 
Data compiled from different business register of employment surveys (BRES). The total 
level	of	employment	in	all	sectors	in	Mansfield	in	2015	was	37,150.
Source: UK Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES).
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This outcome is partly attributable to the perception among 
Leave voters that Labour had a pro-Remain stance and might 
consequently	not	follow	through	with	Brexit.	This	view	was	
reinforced by the vigorous 2017 local-level Conservative 
campaign:	when	Theresa	May	was	asked	during	her	visit	in	
Mansfield	‘why	are	the	Conservatives	so	confident	that	they	
can	turn	the	constituency	blue?’,	the	Prime	Minister	replied	that	
‘the majority of people decided that the UK should leave the EU, 
and	we	are	the	only	party	that	will	deliver	on	the	Brexit	vote.’19 In 
July	2018,	Mr.	Bradley	resigned	from	his	post	as	Vice	Chairman	
of	the	Conservative	Party	in	protest	against	the	government’s	
Brexit policy, stating that ‘if we do not deliver Brexit in spirit as 
well	as	in	name,	then	we	are	handing	Jeremy	Corbyn	the	keys	
to	Number	10.’20
19	 Andy	Done-Johnson.	2017.	Could	Brexit	turn	Mansfield	and	Ashfield	blue?	Mansfield Chad. 17 May. Available at: https://www.chad.co.uk/news/comment-could-
brexit-divide-turn-mansfield-and-ashfield-blue-1-8547510.  
20	 Excerpt	from	Mr.	Bradley’s	resignation	letter	on	10	July	18.	The	full	letter	is	available	at:	https://www.scribd.com/document/383592195/PM-Final.  
21	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.	
22	 I	am	grateful	to	Dominic	Wring	for	pointing	out	this	very	interesting	dimension	of	local-level	politics	in	Mansfield.	Interview	with	Dominic	Wring,	Professor	of	Political	
Communication at Loughborough University, conducted on 23 May 2018. 
23 Howell 2012, 162.
24 Interview with Dominic Wring, 23 May 2018.
Nevertheless, the half-hearted 2017 election campaign by Sir 
Alan Meale, the Labour incumbent since 1987, was cited by 
interviewees	as	another	contributing	factor	to	Labour’s	defeat,	
and can perhaps be attributed to the longstanding perception 
that	Mansfield	was	a	safe	Labour	seat.21 Contrary to the 
impression	that	Labour’s	support	in	Mansfield	as	a	mining	
community	had	been	unfaltering	over	the	years,	Mansfield	
actually	has	a	history	of	defiance	against	perceived	national-
level neglect of local-level interests.22	During	the	1984-1985	
miners’	strike,	the	miners’	community	of	Mansfield	was	
bitterly split between those who followed the Labour Party 
line	and	supported	the	strike,	and	those	who	considered	
that	the	strike	was	in	the	interest	of	less	efficient	mining	
areas	and	would	bring	about	the	ruin	of	Nottinghamshire’s	
distinctive,	productive	coalfield.	Opposed	by	a	‘Moderate	
Labour’	candidate	who	had	been	against	the	strike	and	
following	an	’acrimonious’	campaign	period,	in	1987	Sir	Alan	
Meale	only	won	the	Mansfield	seat	with	a	difference	of	56	
votes from the Conservative candidate.23 Moreover, since 
Mansfield	became	one	of	the	few	towns	in	Britain	to	directly	
elect its Mayor in 2002, the post has always been won by the 
Mansfield	Independents	rather	than	Labour.	According	to	
our	interviewees,	the	defining	characteristic	of	the	Mansfield	
Independents	is	that	they	are	‘community	champions’,	though	
in terms of policy preferences they probably tend towards the 
centre/centre-right.24
Image 1: Buttercross, Mansfield market
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Image 2: ‘Tribute to the British miner’, statue in Mansfield
The 2016 referendum campaign in Mansfield has been described as a ‘one-issue 
debate: It was all about immigration’.25
25	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.	The	view	that	immigration	was	the	main	political	issue	on	the	agenda	during	the	referendum	was	also	supported	
by	our	interview	with	Jim	Burley,	LEADER	Programme	Officer	for	North	Nottinghamshire,	conducted	on	23	May	2018;	our	interview	with	Sue	Kirk,	Financial	Director	at	
Mansfield	Garage	Doors,	conducted	on	24	May	2018;	and	our	interview	with	James	Lowe,	CEO	of	Brightbuster,	conducted	on	29	May	2018.
Explaining the Brexit vote in Mansfield
While	the	backlash	against	immigration	is	often	explained	
as a cultural reaction against social change,26 the evidence 
gathered	in	Mansfield	suggests	that	it	also	has	an	underpinning	
economic element. In particular, the Eastern European 
immigrants	who	moved	to	Mansfield	since	the	early	2000s	
and	took	up	low-paid	work	offered	to	them	via	agencies	
can be seen as an integral part of a business model which 
relies	on	low-skilled,	low-paid	labour,	and	which	spread	in	the	
broader	Mansfield	area	after	the	closure	of	the	mines.	The	
locals’	reaction	against	immigration	cannot	therefore	be	fully	
understood	independently	from	their	views	about	Mansfield’s	
recent economic fortunes.
A	15-minute	drive	north	of	Mansfield,	the	Sports	Direct	
warehouse	in	the	area	of	the	former	colliery	of	Shirebrook	
provides	one	of	the	better-known	examples	of	this	type	of	
business model, which relies on large tracts of cheap land 
and	high	numbers	of	low-paid	workers.	Following	a	series	
of	damning	reports	in	the	local	and	national	press,	working	
practices at the Sports Direct warehouse were scrutinised 
by the parliamentary committee on Business, Innovation and 
Skills,	which	found	that	‘the	way	the	business	model	at	Sports	
Direct	is	operated’	involves	treating	thousands	of	agency	
employees at the warehouse ‘as commodities rather than as 
human	beings	with	rights,	responsibilities	and	aspirations’.27 
In substantiating this claim, the report highlighted the 
agencies’	practice	of	hiring	workers	on	zero-hour	contracts,	
of	intimidating	workers	to	avoid	taking	bathroom	breaks	and	
26 Jennings 2017, pp. 2-3.
27	 Business,	Innovation	and	Skills	Committee.	2016.	Employment	practices	at	Sports	Direct.	Third	Report	of	the	Session	2016-2017.	House of Commons, HC 219. 
22 July, 27. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbis/219/219.pdf.  
28	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
29	 Quoted	in	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills	Committee	2016,	8.
30	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson	25	May	2018.
31	 Quoted	in	Elgot	J.,	Topping	A.,	Morris	S.	and	Halliday	J.	2018.	'We're	not	morons':	Brexit	divisions	harden	across	Britain.	The Guardian. 21 January. Available at: https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/26/uk-brexit-voters-mansfield-bristol-torbay-leeds-post-referendum.  
32	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
sick	leave	through	the	‘six	strikes	and	you	are	out’	policy	and	of	
requiring	workers	to	stay	at	the	warehouse	after	working	hours	
in order to be searched before leaving, which resulted in their 
being paid effectively less than the minimum wage. 
The	locals’	reaction	to	such	business	practices	has	several	
facets. For one, there was a ‘general feeling of unease in 
Mansfield	that	these	jobs	were	actually	being	created	for	
people	from	out	of	the	area’.28		A	worker	at	the	Shirebrook	
warehouse noted that ‘when the colliery was closed and the 
town	began	to	suffer,	local	people	were	promised	80%	of	the	
jobs,	but	it	came	to	less	than	30%,	and	the	majority	of	jobs	
went	to	Eastern	European	workers’.29	And	it	wasn’t	just	the	
lowest-paid	jobs	that	were	given	to	immigrants:	‘I	spoke	to	quite	
a	few	of	the	British	workers	who	worked	in	there,	and	there	
was a sense of real resentment that the Poles had all the good 
jobs,	the	supervisors	were	Poles.’30 Secondly, there is the issue 
of wage competition: ‘There are people coming here willing 
to	work	for	a	lot	less	(...)	If	they’re	here	to	work	for	£2	an	hour,	
they	shouldn’t	be	here.’31 But beyond the well-studied themes 
of job and wage competition, there is a reaction against the 
type	of	job	itself,	which	provides	little	opportunity	to	acquire	
skills,	develop	professionally	and	contribute	to	an	activity	that	
is	important	for	the	town’s	identity	and	long-term	development:	
‘this	notion	of	coming	here,	taking	our	jobs,	isn’t	actually	true,	
because	none	of	them	want	these	jobs’.32 ‘I feel sorry for the 
young	today,’	remarked	a	former	miner	from	Kirkby-in-Ashfield.	
‘There’s	nothing	there	for	them,	nothing	(…)	It’s	all	gone.	They’ve	
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let	it	all	go,	them	powers	what	be.’33 The reaction against this 
type of business model that emerged in the post-coal mining 
period	in	Mansfield	and	relied	heavily	on	foreign	agency	labour	
can be interpreted as one of the mechanisms through which 
the	backlash	against	immigration	is	related	to	phenomena	of	
relative economic decline, as Will Jennings has argued.34 
On	the	other	hand,	with	Mansfield	being	a	relatively	isolated	
and until now relatively homogeneous community, there is also 
a cultural aspect to the reaction to immigration. Despite (and 
also	because	of)	Mansfield’s	central	location,	‘people	tend	to	
stay	roughly	in	the	area,	rather	than	move	about	(…)	You	can	
get	anywhere	you	want	from	here,	and	it’s	like	the	middle	of	
nowhere,	but	kind	of	in	the	middle	of	everywhere	as	well.’35 
This	sense	of	insularity,	combined	with	the	lack	of	history	of	
immigration	to	the	area,	magnified	the	impact	of	the	arrival	of	
the new immigrant community: ‘all of a sudden Polish shops 
spring	up	everywhere,	they’ve	got	Polish	neighbours,	they	see	
their	Polish	neighbours	go	out	to	work…’36
However,	arguably,	even	this	cultural	side	of	the	backlash	to	
immigration	is	also	interlinked	with	the	structure	of	Mansfield’s	
economy.	Indeed,	the	visible	manifestations	of	a	tightly-knit	
community that the Eastern European immigrants have created 
33	 Quoted	in	Chaffin	2018.
34 Jennings 2017, 13
35	 Interview	with	Jim	Burley,	23	May	2018.	Andy	Done-Johnson	also	mentioned	that	‘because	Mansfield	sits	so	on	its	own,	it	has	made	for	a	very	sort	of	insular	approach	
to	the	world	for	a	lot	of	people’,	25	May	2018.
36	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
37	 The	Mansfield	District	Council	states	its	vision	for	the	regeneration	of	the	town	centre	in	the	following	way:	‘There	are	great	opportunities	to	re-establish	the	centre	as	
(…)	a	place	of	great	civic	pride,	recognised	regionally	for	its	commercial	centre	and	proud	of	its	heritage.’	Mansfield	District	Council.	2009.	Creating a ‘City Centre’ for 
Mansfield 2009-19, iii. Available at: https://invest.ashfield-mansfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/creating-a-city-centre-for-mansfield-lo-res.pdf. 
38	 See	Elgot	et	al	2018:	‘When	Marvin	Salisbury	was	growing	up	in	Mansfield,	the	market	packed	the	town	square	and	stretched	far	up	the	surrounding	streets.	“There	
were	proper	butchers’	stalls,	fish,	everything,’’	the	former	miner	said,	sitting	in	the	winter	sunshine	outside	the	town	hall.	“You	could	get	anything	you	want.	And	now	
look	at	it.”’	The	local	communities’	discontent	as	large	retailers	move	to	the	outskirts	of	towns	and	town	centres	decline,	was	also	mentioned	in	our	interview	with	Jim	
Burley, 23 May 2018. 
39	 For	example:	‘To	their	credit,	the	District	Council	had	a	really	big	push	a	couple	of	years	ago	to	regenerate,	reinvigorate	the	market.	They	wanted	more	diversity	in	there,	
more	original	craft,	or	artisan	baking,	things	like	that.	I	think	one	of	the	issues	is	that	there	really	isn’t	enough	of	that	within	the	local	community.’	Interview	with	Andy	
Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
40 Department for Communities and Local Government 2006, 196.
41	 Quoted	in	Chaffin	2018.
in	Mansfield	co-exist	with	a	sense	that	following	the	collapse	
of coal mining and the traditional manufacturing sectors, 
the search for an identity for the indigenous population of 
Mansfield	is	still	continuing.	The	economic	activities	currently	
taking	place	are	not	filling	this	gap	with	a	similar	sense	
of ownership and pride as those of the past. The decline 
of	Mansfield’s	beautiful	town	centre	despite	the	Council’s	
sustained regeneration efforts,37	and	the	difficulty	of	renting	
the	pitches	at	Mansfield’s	historic	market	to	merchants	selling	
a	range	of	quality	goods,	constitute	one	aspect	of	this	story.38 
Another	aspect	relates	to	the	relative	difficulty	of	creating	a	
widespread culture of establishing new businesses to produce 
goods and services that valorise local resources,39 something 
that has to do with ‘the legacy of a period when a single 
employer,	British	Coal,	was	the	dominant	employer’.40 And 
while there is no doubt that the large number of big non-local 
wholesale	stores	that	visually	dominate	the	broader	Mansfield	
area contributes in a crucial way to the local economy, they 
typically sell goods that are neither from nor for the local 
community.	In	the	words	of	a	long-time	councillor	in	Ashfield:	
‘what	is	it	–	30	years	since	the	mines	closed?	And	we	still	
haven’t	got	it	right.	The	big	problem	we	have	in	Ashfield	and	
Mansfield	is	we	don’t	have	an	identity.’41
Image 3: ‘Mighty Mansfield: Leaders of Europe in thin seam working’, miners at Mansfield Colliery, 1987
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Image 5: ‘Bridge Tavern’ pub and ‘Babushka’ Russian & 
European Deli, a large and well-stocked Eastern European 
food store
Image 4: ‘Made in Mansfield’: An exhibition at the Mansfield museum about Mansfield’s historic industries. ‘Forty years ago 
the early morning streets were busy as thousands of people went to work. In 1981 43,400 workers made products that were 
sold around the world.’ 
Excerpt from the exhibition
Image 6: View of the Mansfield market Image 7: Sports Direct retail store near Mansfield train station
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Brexit and immigration
When	asking	representatives	of	local	businesses	and	local	
authorities	what	is	the	biggest	challenge	that	firms	face	in	
the	Mansfield	area,	the	first	answer	that	usually	comes	to	
mind	has	to	do	with	‘access	to	skills’.42 A study by Experian 
also highlighted the ‘low levels of educational attainment 
and	corresponding	lack	of	skills’	as	the	biggest	weakness	
of	the	Mansfield	and	Ashfield	economy,	particularly	given	
that ‘employment projections forecast a strong employment 
demand	for	people	with	intermediate	and	higher-level	skills.’43 
The problem is felt in a number of sectors, but is particularly 
acute	in	high	value-added	sectors.	In	the	words	of	the	CEO	
of	Lindhurst	Engineering,	an	award-winning	local	firm	in	
the	engineering	sector,	‘we’ve	underinvested	in	developing	
our	people	for	such	a	long	time,	if	we	benchmark	ourselves	
compared to the rest of Europe, we lag woefully behind in 
terms	of	skill	level.’44
While	the	root	cause	of	the	mismatch	between	skills	demand	
and	supply	in	the	Mansfield	economy	has	to	do	with	the	
structure of higher education and training provision in the area, 
some interviewees considered that the problem ‘has been 
masked	considerably	by	the	fact	that	we’ve	got	a	lot	of	foreign	
workers’.45	Depending	on	the	Brexit	deal,	the	problem	of	skills	
shortages that local businesses face could therefore become 
more acute. The number of non-British employees is lower in 
Mansfield	than	in	other	parts	of	the	country,	but	the	reduction	
of EU immigrants that is already observed in the UK as a 
whole since the 2016 referendum46 could disproportionately 
affect some sectors that are socioeconomically important for 
Mansfield,	such	as	high-end	sectors	that	offer	well-paid	jobs,	
as well as the care sector.47 Indeed, even interviewees who do 
not	consider	that	Brexit	will	pose	‘any	problem	whatsoever’	for	
the local economy overall, recognise that ‘our NHS would not 
survive	if	we	didn’t	have	immigrants	coming	in’,	and	that	the	
42	 Interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	25	May	2018.	Similar	answers	were	given	in	our	interview	with	Martin	Rigley,	CEO	of	Lindhurst	Engineering,	and	Brian	Stopford,	
Director	at	Stopford	Associates,	conducted	on	24	May	2018;	our	interview	with	Keith	Barnes,	packaging	consultant	at	K.B.	Consulting,	conducted	on	24	May	2018;	and	
our	interview	with	Ben	Bradley,	MP	for	Mansfield,	conducted	on	11	June	2018.
43 Experian 2009, 42.
44 Interview with Martin Rigley and Brian Stopford, 24 May 2018.
45 Ibid.
46	 Office	for	National	Statistics.	2018.	Migration Statistics Quarterly Report. 16 July. Figure 3. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/
populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/july2018revisedfrommaycoveringtheperiodtodecember2017.   
47	 EU	nationals	make	up	5.6%	of	all	NHS	staff,	including	9.6%	of	hospital	doctors	and	7.1%	of	nurses	and	health	visitors:	see	House	of	Commons	Library.	2018.	NHS staff 
from overseas: statistics.	Briefing	Paper	#7783.	7	February.	Available	at:	https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7783#fullreport. 
The	Mansfield	MP	Mr.	Bradley	also	mentioned	in	our	interview	that	a	reduction	of	EU	immigrants	could	pose	‘a	challenge	in	recruitment,	particularly	in	the	NHS’,	11	
June	2018.	Regarding	recruitment	in	high-end	businesses,	the	following	indicative	anecdote	was	mentioned	by	one	of	our	interviewees:	‘We’ve	employed	an	Italian	
lady	who’s	got	a	PhD,	she	was	back	in	Italy	on	holiday	with	her	parents	in	the	Brexit	vote,	and	that	morning	she	sent	an	e-mail	saying,	can	I	come	back?	She	honestly	
thought	that	was	it!’
48 Interview with Keith Barnes, 24 May 2018.
49	 Interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	25	May	2018.
50 Interview with Ben Bradley, 11 June 2018.
51	 For	example,	by	improving	support	for	West	Nottinghamshire	College	and	Nottingham	Trent	University,	two	of	the	major	higher	education	institutions	in	the	Mansfield	
District and Nottinghamshire respectively. See Experian 2009, 43.
Conservatives	will	eventually	have	to	admit	that	‘we’re	going	to	
cut	[immigration]	down,	but	we	don’t	want	to	cut	it	too	much,	
because	we	need	them’.48 And although it is open to discussion 
whether	in	the	long	term	the	decline	in	the	availability	of	skilled	
employees	from	abroad	will	push	firms	in	high	value-added	
sectors to invest more in training the local labour force, or 
whether instead it will compel them to move in areas with a 
higher	availability	of	skilled	labour,	there	is	little	doubt	that	in	the	
short	term,	‘if	you’re	restricting	the	supply	of	labour	to	a	firm,	it’s	
going	to	affect	that	firm’s	competitiveness’.49 
In order to mitigate this challenge, it would be important to 
assess	local	needs	for	foreign	skilled	workers	in	businesses	
and public services, and to ensure that the Brexit deal will 
continue to allow these needs to be met. As mentioned by 
the	Mansfield	MP	Mr.	Bradley:	‘if	you	don’t	get	a	[post-Brexit]	
arrangement	where	people	have	access	to	the	right	skills,	
then	it	will	be	a	real	problem	for	a	lot	of	business	(…)	I	think	
it	depends	on	the	deal	chiefly.’50 Moreover, addressing the 
underlying	problem	of	increasing	the	skill	level	of	the	local	
population becomes more urgent than ever in the context of 
Brexit. There is a need to both improve the local-level availability 
of	quality	training,51 and to provide incentives for the local 
population	to	make	maximum	use	of	training	opportunities	(for	
instance,	by	making	it	cheaper	for	local	youth	to	attend	higher	
education or vocational training). Indeed, in the medium term, 
a substantial move in that direction could counterbalance the 
potential	negative	effects	of	Brexit	on	firms’	access	to	skilled	
labour	in	the	Mansfield	area.
The	reduction	in	immigration	that	is	likely	to	occur	after	Britain’s	
departure from the EU will probably also have an effect on the 
economic	activities	of	companies	like	Sports	Direct,	which	will	
find	it	harder	to	recruit	agency	labour	from	other	EU	countries.	If	
one of the tacit, underlying demands of the Leave vote in 
Mansfield	was	to	reduce	the	appeal	of	this	type	of	business	
‘Office	 ‘‘The	 Pen’’	 -	 translations	 and	
advice;	money	transfers	to	Poland’:	
An	advertisement	in	Mansfield
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model for all the reasons mentioned in the previous section of 
this report, then a reduction in the supply of foreign agency 
labour	could	fit	that	purpose.	However,	if	firms	that	rely	on	EU	
agency	labour	start	to	relocate	out	of	Mansfield,	it	is	far	from	
certain that higher value-added types of businesses will 
automatically	take	their	place.52 In this context, it is useful to 
consider	the	town’s	past	experience	with	industrial	restructuring:
“Mansfield has kind of suffered in the same way 
that a lot of former coalfield communities have 
suffered. When the pits finally went, there was 
really no plan B as to what happens to those 
communities. And I think for a very long time (…) 
you had a kind of collective washing of hands as 
to what should be done there.”53
Mansfield’s	experience	following	the	closure	of	the	mines	
indicates	that	free	markets	alone	cannot	automatically	
guarantee development along a high value-added direction: 
such a path must be pursued purposely through appropriate 
policies tailored to match the local economic context. The 
same will continue to apply after Brexit, whether the supply of 
foreign labour is restricted or not.   
Brexit and policies for local economic 
development
At the moment, EU-funded programmes constitute a core 
part	of	regional	development	policies	in	the	Mansfield	area.	
A large part of this funding subsidises activities such as 
training programmes, university-industry collaborations and 
support programmes for start-up businesses, thereby fostering 
precisely	the	type	of	actions	that	are	important	for	Mansfield’s	
development along a higher value-added path: in the words of 
one of our interviewees, ‘there is some good business support 
available,	but	the	majority	of	it	is	actually	EU-funded’.54 As a 
result,	and	also	given	the	longstanding	grievance	in	Mansfield	
about	the	inadequacy	of	investment	in	the	region	by	the	
government, which has led people to feel ‘left behind in terms 
of	the	government	caring	about	things	outside	of	London’,55 it is 
important to consider how policies for regional development in 
52	 As	mentioned	by	a	taxi	driver	in	Mansfield,	migrants	are	an	indicator	of	economic	vibrancy	for	the	town,	regardless	of	the	type	of	jobs	they	do:	‘The	economy	of	
Mansfield	is	thriving!	Look	at	how	many	Eastern	Europeans	work	here	–	this	means	that	there	are	many	jobs	in	the	town.’
53	 Interview	with	Andy	Done-Johnson,	25	May	2018.
54 Interview with James Lowe, 29 May 2018.
55 Interview with Ben Bradley, 11 June 2018.
56	 European	Commission.	What	is	Horizon	2020?	Available	at:	https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/what-horizon-2020. Under current exchange rates, 
€80 billion translates to about £71 billion. 
57	 Interview	with	the	CEO	of	Lindhurst	Engineering,	Martin	Rigley,	conducted	on	18	June	2017	in	the	context	of	filming	a	short	documentary	to	accompany	this	report.
58	 UK	research	institutions	and	firms	actually	have	very	high	success	in	obtaining	Horizon	2020	grants,	reflecting	the	high	level	of	research	conducted	in	the	UK.	
Between	2014-2016,	the	UK	was	the	country	with	the	highest	number	of	participants	in	Horizon	2020	programmes	in	the	whole	EU,	followed	by	Germany	and	Spain.	
See European Commission. 2018. Horizon 2020 in full swing: Three years on: Key facts and figures 2014-2016, 27. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
horizon2020/sites/horizon2020/files/h2020_threeyearson_a4_horizontal_2018_web.pdf 
59 EU ESIF funds include three separate funding streams: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD).
the	Mansfield	area	will	be	affected	after	Britain	pulls	out	of	the	
EU’s	regional	funding	programmes.
It is worth starting this discussion by giving a few concrete 
examples	of	EU-funded	projects	in	the	broader	Mansfield	
economy, because these projects tend to have little visibility, 
and	are	consequently	not	widely	known.	The	first	example	
concerns	a	Horizon	2020	grant	recently	awarded	to	Lindhurst	
Engineering,	a	local	firm	that	was	born	in	the	coal	industry,	and	
which	now	exemplifies	the	type	of	hi-tech,	innovative	business	
that	one	would	like	to	see	flourishing	around	Mansfield.	Horizon	
2020 is an EU Research and Innovation programme, with nearly 
€80 billion of funding available for the 2014-2020 period across 
the EU.56	The	CEO	of	Lindhurst	Engineering	described	the	
importance	of	this	EU	grant	for	his	firm	in	the	following	way:
“The European money was really useful for us. (…) 
[This type of funding enables us to] bridge the gap 
which we call the ‘valley of death’ for R&D projects. 
I don’t know if you are familiar with Technology 
Readiness Levels – [it is a method of estimating 
the maturity of a technology; the scale ranges 
from TRL 1 to TRL 9, with TRL 9 representing the 
highest level of technological maturity]. We’re 
somewhere at TRL 7-8. What tends to happen, 
particularly within the UK, is technologies get to 
that level, and R&D stops because you’re nearly 
there. But you need investment to jump across that 
gap, and we’re really really poor at it in the UK. And 
a lot of technologies either wither on the pine at 
that point, or get overseas investment, and then all 
the invention and innovation that we come up with, 
some other country benefits from”57 
While	Horizon	2020	grants	can	be	won	by	research	institutions	
and	firms	anywhere	in	the	EU	through	a	competitive	process,58 
each EU region is entitled to a particular allocation of European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF),59 depending on its 
per capita GDP. The Local Enterprise Partnership for Derby, 
Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire (D2N2 LEP), 
where	Mansfield	belongs	administratively,	has	an	allocation	of	
€250	million	of	ESIF	funding	to	spend	during	the	2014-2020	
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period.60 Some of the projects 
funded with this money include 
a £7.2 million Digital Business 
Growth Programme, which 
supports	around	850	local	
Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs)	to	make	better	use	
of digital connectivity, and the 
£3	million	‘Money	Sorted	in	D2N2’	
project, which provides advice to unemployed 
people on how to deal more effectively with money issues and 
access	the	financial	help	to	which	they	are	entitled.61 Moreover, 
ESIF funding has also contributed to some of the regeneration 
projects	that	have	recently	taken	place	in	Mansfield:	for	
example,	the	Mansfield	District	Council	secured	£862,119	of	
EU funding to contribute towards the cost of the Passenger 
Interchange	Link,62	which	was	one	of	the	Council’s	flagship	
regeneration initiatives.63 Finally, some streams of EU funds 
are available for supporting the tourism and heritage sectors, 
which	may	be	smaller	in	terms	of	size	than	other	sectors	in	the	
Mansfield	economy,	but	which	are	important	when	it	comes	to	
the issue of local identity that was discussed in the previous 
section	of	this	report.	For	example,	the	officer	in	charge	of	
the implementation of the EU LEADER funding programme in 
North Nottinghamshire, which supports small businesses in 
the tourism, agriculture and forestry sectors, recalls a LEADER 
investment of around £30,000 to support the creation of an 
upscale café at the town centre of Retford: ‘it was in the middle 
of Retford, it attracted large amounts of tourism, there was 
something	like	15	jobs	involved	–	it	was	exactly	the	type	of	
project	we	were	looking	for.’64
60 Local Enterprise Partnership for Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. 2017. D2N2 Annual Review 2016/17,	15.	Available	at	http://www.d2n2lep.org/
write/D2N2_Annual_Review_2016-17.pdf.	Under	current	exchange	rates,	€250	million	translates	to	about	£223	million.	
61	 Ibid,	15.
62	 UK	Government.	Beneficiaries	Under	the	East	Midlands	2007	to	2013	ERDF	Programme.	Available	at:	https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479592/East_Midlands_List_of_Beneficiaries_Nov_15.pdf.	Unfortunately,	it	is	very	difficult	to	find	detailed	information	about	
the exact contribution of EU funding to regeneration projects in the area as a whole. 
63	 	See	Mansfield	District	Council	2009,	21.
64 Interview with Jim Burley, 23 May 2018.
65	 Interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	25	May	2018.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Interview with Jim Burley, 23 May 2018.
Apart	from	the	level	of	funding	provided	by	the	EU	to	firms	
and	institutions	in	the	Mansfield	area	for	the	types	of	activities	
mentioned above, EU regional development policies have 
some	specific	positive	characteristics	that	differ	from	those	
of	equivalent	UK	policies,	and	that	must	be	taken	into	account	
when planning for the post-Brexit period. As explained by the 
CEO	of	the	D2N2	LEP,	EU	funding	is:	
“long term, six-seven years, it identifies a pot 
of money for the local area (…) So you’ve got a 
continuity of support, and it doesn’t fluctuate 
with the electoral cycles of the UK, it’s not on-off, 
on-off (…) [With EU funding,] at least we know that 
we can design a particular set of programmes 
to work together, and even if the bureaucracy is 
cumbersome, we can try and work around that.”65 
In contrast, so far, UK funding for regional development has 
often been structured around national programmes announced 
at irregular intervals, for which regional actors had to bid. This 
type	of	policy	deprives	regional-level	policy-makers	of	the	
certainty and stability that accompanies EU structural funds66.
In addition, EU regional development policy has consistently 
empowered local- and regional-level policy actors to 
develop their own development strategies and manage the 
implementation	of	EU	funds;	on	the	contrary,	‘in	the	UK,	we’ve	
been	hot	and	cold	on	regions,	we’ve	been	consistently	kind	of	
centralist	in	our	funding	policy’.67 
Finally, some streams of EU funding have put a strong 
emphasis	on	supporting	Small	and	Medium-sized	Enterprises	
(SMEs).	In	the	words	of	the	programme	officer	for	EU	LEADER	
funds in North Nottinghamshire: 
“I’ve been doing LEADER for quite a long time, 
for nearly ten years now, and I was always quite 
militant about what it was. As a country, we 
seem to be missing that small business man 
or woman, you know the one-man bands, one-
woman bands, two-woman bands, who live in the 
rural areas and have their businesses (…) And I 
think the last LEADER programme really hit the 
nail in the head [in supporting such endeavours] 
with the bottom-up approach.”68
of EU ESIF funding 
available to spend 
at the D2N2 area for the  
2014-2020 period
€250
MILLION
Image 8: EU-funded Kings Mill Reservoir near Mansfield
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Relatedly,	the	founder	and	CEO	of	a	small	Nottingham-based	
business	in	the	creative	industries	said	that	the	support	his	firm	
received	from	EU-funded	programmes	was	‘invaluable’	in	terms	
of	enabling	the	business	to	have	a	‘strong	start’.	By	giving	
Nottinghamshire-based SMEs access to training, expertise and 
subsidised internship wages, EU funding schemes address 
precisely	the	‘two	gaps	that	you	have	when	you’re	starting	off	a	
business:	not	having	as	much	funding	as	we	would	like,	and	as	
much	expertise	as	we	need.’69
The UK is a net contributor to the EU budget, which means 
that following Brexit, the government would be in a position to 
replace the entire set of EU funding schemes with identical or 
improved national-level versions of those schemes:
“If the government were to say, here is a 
seven-year allocation of funding for your area, 
which you need to spend in support of these 
broad policy objectives, and it’s up to you to 
determine the priorities within this broad overall 
framework, then that might actually lead to 
even better policy.”70 
Nevertheless,	given	the	UK	government’s	historical	
ambivalence towards stable, long-term regional development 
programmes	with	a	strong	role	for	local	stakeholders	in	the	
planning and implementation policy stages, these are issues 
that need to be considered and debated, in order to ensure 
that	Mansfield	doesn’t	lose	any	funding	or	control	towards	the	
central level of government after Britain leaves the EU.
Trade effects of Brexit
The issue of the impact that an increase in trade barriers 
between the UK and the EU would have on particular British 
sectors and regions has been the subject of a few recent 
quantitative	analyses,	and	we	will	refer	to	two	of	those	here.	
The	first	study,	which	was	conducted	at	the	City	REDI	Institute	
of the University of Birmingham, measured the current exposure 
of different UK industries to trade with EU countries. UK 
industries are exposed to trade with the EU not only when they 
export	final	products	to	EU	countries,	but	also	when	they	use	
materials, components and inputs that are imported from the 
EU, and when they provide inputs for other UK exporters. The 
69 Interview with James Lowe, 29 May 2018.
70	 Interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	25	May	2018.	See	also	the	conclusion	of	a	recent	academic	article	on	the	effect	of	the	EU’s	Cohesion	Policy	on	UK	regions:	‘The	
prospective	withdrawal	of	the	UK	from	the	EU	and	the	loss	of	eligibility	for	Cohesion	Policy	funding	will	not	only	deprive	the	UK’s	regional	economies	of	an	important	
source	of	investment	funds	but	also	most	definitely	of	a	mechanism	via	which	forces	of	economic	divergence	have	been	in	the	past	–	at	least	partly	–	neutralized.	It	
follows	that	policy	efforts	in	the	post-EU	era,	such	as	the	‘‘Shared	Prosperity	Fund’’	proposed	by	the	UK	government	as	a	replacement	of	EU	funds,	should	concentrate	
on developing a similarly funded regional development policy which will substitute for the withdrawal of the Cohesion Policy interventions and, indeed, improve on 
these.’	Di	Cataldo	M.	and	Monastiriotis	V.	2018.	Regional	needs,	regional	targeting	and	regional	growth:	an	assessment	of	EU	Cohesion	Policy	in	UK	regions.	Regional 
Studies, 11.
71	 Los	B.,	Chen	W.,	McCann	P.	and	Ortega-Argilés	R.	December	2017.	An	Assessment	of	Brexit	Risks	for	54	Industries:	Most	Services	Industries	are	also	Exposed.	City-
REDI Policy Briefing Series, University of Birmingham., 4. Available at: https://blog.bham.ac.uk/cityredi/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2018/01/City-REDI-Briefing-
Template_Sectoral-Analysis.pdf.  
72	 Dhingra	S.,	Machin	S.	and	Overman	H.G.	July	2017.	The	Local	Economic	Effects	of	Brexit.	CEP Brexit Series: Paper No. 10. Available at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/brexit10.pdf.  
authors of the study calculated the share of the value added 
of different UK industries that crosses a UK-EU border at least 
once.	They	subsequently	estimated	how	much	value	added	
would be lost in each industry if all trade between the UK and 
the EU were to cease after Brexit. The authors then constructed 
a	‘value	added	at	risk’	index,	which	indicates	the	difference	for	
each industry between the level of value added under the no-
trade scenario, and the level of value added in 2014. The study 
found	that	in	the	UK	economy	as	a	whole,	‘about	8.5%	of	UK	
GDP	–	in	2014	almost	£140	billion	per	annum	–	is	at	risk	due	to	
Brexit.’		The	exposure	to	trade	with	the	EU	varies	substantially	
among	different	industries:	the	share	of	value	added	at	risk	
is	estimated	to	be	only	2%	for	the	construction	sector,	2%	for	
retail	trade,	11%	for	architectural	and	engineering	services,	
16%	for	warehousing	services,	19%	for	administrative	and	
support	services,	a	high	22%	for	rubber	and	plastic	products,	
24%	for	wholesale	trade	and	36%	for	professional,	scientific	
and technical services, to mention but a few sectors that are 
important	for	the	wider	Mansfield	economy.71
However, the mere fact that an industry is exposed to trade with 
the	EU	doesn’t	mean	that	this	industry	will	necessarily	suffer	
proportionally	when	Britain	leaves	the	EU;	after	all,	the	extent	to	
which trade between Britain and the EU will decline after Brexit 
depends crucially on the type of deal that will be reached. The 
second study that we refer to here, which was conducted at 
LSE CEP, uses a model of the world economy to forecast the 
local-level economic effects of the increase in trade barriers 
that	would	occur	under	a	‘soft	Brexit’	scenario	and	a	‘hard	Brexit’	
scenario.	Under	the	‘soft	Brexit’	scenario,	in	which	Britain	would	
join a free trade area with the EU, the study predicts a decrease 
in the gross value added of goods and services produced in 
Mansfield	of	1.2%,	close	to	the	national	average	of	1.14%.	Under	
the	‘hard	Brexit’	scenario,	in	which	Britain	and	the	EU	do	not	join	
a free trade area but charge each other tariffs according to the 
rules	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	the	gross	value	added	
of	goods	and	services	produced	in	Mansfield	is	predicted	to	
decrease	by	2.2%,	once	again	very	close	to	the	national	average	
of	2.12%.	Overall,	the	study	predicts	that	areas	in	southern	
England will be affected more negatively by an increase in trade 
barriers with the EU than areas in the north, with the City of 
London being predicted to suffer from a decrease in gross value 
added	of	1.9%	under	the	‘soft	Brexit’	scenario,	and	of	4.3%	under	
the	‘hard	Brexit’	scenario.72  
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During	our	fieldwork	in	Mansfield	in	May	2018,	these	results	
were discussed in many of our interviews, and we found that 
several	stakeholders	were	actually	not	that	worried	about	the	
economic impact of an increase in trade barriers following 
Brexit. The primary reason for this is that several interviewees 
didn’t	actually	consider	that	trade	would	substantially	
decline after Britain leaves the EU. For example, Mrs. Sue 
Kirk,	financial	director	at	the	local	family-owned	business	
Mansfield	Garage	Doors,	reflected	in	the	following	way	about	
the	future	of	the	firm’s	relationship	with	its	main	supplier,	the	
German multinational Hörmann: ‘Hörmann are going to want 
to	sell	to	us	whether	we	are	in	the	EU	or	not,	aren’t	they?	(…)	
Although	it’s	a	German	company,	we	deal	with	their	British	
office,	and	they’ve	not	mentioned	Brexit	to	us	at	all.’73 The idea 
that	trade	links	with	the	EU	will	not	be	severely	disrupted	after	
Brexit because it is as much in the interest of EU producers 
to trade with the UK as it is in the interest of UK producers to 
trade with the EU, was developed further by Mr. Keith Barnes, 
a	local	packaging	consultant:
“I am absolutely convinced that once whatever 
rules they try to make are set out, accountants 
will find their way round them, so that whoever 
is producing in Germany and France can 
still sell at a preferential rate in the UK (…) 
There will be minimal barriers, or methods 
to get around them. I mean, Volkswagen are 
not going to stop selling cars to the UK! Why 
should they? (…) People in Europe need us as 
much as we need them.”74
These	arguments	are	reinforced	by	a	firm	belief	in	the	
competence of the British authorities to secure the interests of 
British	producers	during	the	negotiations:	‘I	think	there’s	loads	
of	things	being	sorted	out,	that	we	will	know	as	time	leads	on.’75 
The fact that two years after the 2016 referendum, exporting 
businesses in particular have not suffered any concrete 
negative	economic	consequences	due	to	Brexit,	but	have	in	
fact	benefited	from	the	devaluation	of	the	pound,	reinforces	the	
climate of wait-and-see and even mild optimism that prevailed 
in several of our interviews.76	The	difficulty	of	making	credible	
73	 Interview	with	Sue	Kirk,	24	May	2018.
74	 Interview	with	Keith	Barnes,	24	May	2018.	In	connection	to	this	remark,	it	is	worth	noting	that	even	though	Britain	imports	more	than	it	exports	to	the	EU,	this	doesn’t	
mean that that particular EU regions or countries are more exposed to trade with the UK than Britain is exposed to trade with the EU. This is because the EU is much 
larger than Britain, and the cost of Brexit will be distributed across several countries. See also the conclusion of a study conducted at the City REDI Institute of the 
University	of	Birmingham:	’The	UK	and	its	regions	are	far	more	vulnerable	to	trade-related	risks	of	Brexit	than	other	EU	member	states	and	their	regions.’	See:	Chen	W.,	
Los	B.,	McCann	P.,	Ortega-Argilés	R.,	Thissen	M.	and	van	Oort	F.	2018.	The	continental	divide?	Economic	exposure	to	Brexit	in	regions	and	countries	on	both	sides	of	
the Channel. Papers in Regional Science 97, 38.
75	 Interview	with	Keith	Barnes,	24	May	2018.	Similarly,	the	following	was	mentioned	in	another	interview:	‘I’m	sure	that	behind	the	scenes	people	are	working	towards	the	
fact	that	there’s	going	to	be	a	Brexit,	and	what	the	effect	is	going	to	be	on	the	local	economy,	and	the	national	economy	as	well.’	
76	 ‘We’ve	come	along	so	far	without	Brexit	affecting	us	too	much’.	Interview	with	Sue	Kirk,	24	May	2018.	‘The	visions	of	the	people	begging	at	the	door	of	your	neighbour	
–	it	just	hasn’t	happened,	we’ve	gotten	better	and	better’.	Interview	with	Keith	Barnes,	24	May	2018.	In	our	interview	with	Martin	Rigley	and	Brian	Stopford,	24	May	
2018,	it	was	also	mentioned	that	‘we’ve	certainly	seen	an	upturn	in	exports	due	to	the	weakness	of	the	pound’,	though	the	interviewees	were	more	cautious	in	their	
assessments	about	trade	barriers	in	the	future,	not	least	because	there	are	also	‘emotional	aspects	to	this	as	well’.
77	 For	example,	in	one	of	our	interviews	the	following	was	mentioned:	‘Who	knows	really	at	this	moment	in	time	if	Brexit	is	going	to	be	successful	or	not	(…)	Maybe	in	
many	years	to	come,	it	will	become	evident	whether	it	was	the	right	decision	or	not	–	I	think	it’s	all	too	early	to	actually	think	about	that.’	
78	 Breinlich	H.,		Leromain	E.,	Novy	D.	and	Sampson	T.	November	2017.	The	Brexit	Vote,	Inflation	and	UK	Living	Standards.	CEP Brexit Series, Paper No. 11. 
Available at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit11.pdf 
79 Interview with Jim Burley, 23 May 2018.
forecasts about such a complex issue was also seen by some 
as a reason not to be very concerned for the time being.77    
Overall,	to	the	extent	that	a	number	of	stakeholders	in	the	
Mansfield	economy	are	not	as	worried	about	a	potential	rise	
in trade barriers with the EU as the authors of the impact 
assessment studies cited at the beginning of this section, this 
is mostly because they do not consider that such a rise in trade 
barriers	is	likely	to	materialise.	This	observation	in	itself	has	
clear policy implications for the type of Brexit deal that would 
be	considered	as	beneficial	for	the	local	economy.
Brexit and inflation
The flip-side of the devaluation of the pound that occurred after 
the	2016	referendum,	which	has	benefited	the	UK’s	exporting	
businesses as mentioned in the previous sub-section, has been 
an increase in inflation. According to a study conducted by LSE 
CEP, in the year following the referendum the Brexit vote led to 
an increase in inflation by 1.7 percentage points, which cost 
‘the	average	household	£7.74	per	week	through	higher	prices.	
That	is	equivalent	to	£404	per	year.’78 The concern that Brexit 
will be associated with an increase in inflation, and particularly 
in	food	prices,	thereby	affecting	‘the	working	classes’	
especially,79 was also expressed during some of our interviews . 
This	problem	could	be	magnified	after	Britain’s	withdrawal	from	
the	EU’s	Common	Agricultural	Policy,	which	provides	generous	
subsidies	to	the	agricultural	sector,	thereby	keeping	food	prices	
down. Given that, as seen earlier in the report, median annual 
earnings	in	Mansfield	are	quite	low	compared	to	the	national	
average, should the prices of basic goods continue to rise 
after	Britain’s	departure	from	the	EU,	it	would	be	good	to	put	
measures in place in order to minimise the impact of these 
changes on the most vulnerable members of the community.
Image 9: Offices of Mansfield Garage Doors
15
Image 10: Mansfield’s bus station
If	we	were	to	summarise	the	challenge	that	Mansfield	 
needs to meet in the future, we would use the words of one  
of our interviewees:
“Either we are an area that has the skills 
[necessary to attract the industries of the 
future], and where businesses are attuned to 
the opportunities and the changes that are 
happening, or other places do it faster, and 
we get left behind, and we get left with doing 
Amazon order fulfilments rather than actually 
helping design and shape high-quality goods.”80
Brexit	interrelates	with	this	challenge	in	multifaceted	ways.	On	
the	one	hand,	we	have	argued	that	the	remarkably	high	share	
of the Leave vote in the area cannot be understood without 
taking	into	consideration	some	structural	characteristics	of	
the	Mansfield	economy	in	the	post-coal	mining	period.	These	
include the growth of a type of business model that relies 
on	low-skilled,	low-paid	agency	labour	often	from	other	EU	
countries,	and	the	lack	of	large-scale	economic	activities	
which can instil in the local community the sense of ownership 
and pride that existed when coal mining and the traditional 
manufacturing	industries	still	flourished	in	Mansfield.	
On	the	other	hand,	even	if	businesses	at	the	low	end	of	
the value-added scale suffer a blow from the decrease in 
immigration	from	the	EU	that	is	likely	to	occur	after	Brexit,	
this does not mean that their activities will be automatically 
replaced	with	better-paid	and	more	satisfactory	jobs.	On	the	
contrary, as seen in the previous section, Brexit by itself is not 
likely	to	solve	the	underlying	structural	problems	of	Mansfield’s	
economy, and may actually exacerbate some of the challenges 
that	high	value-added	firms	face	in	the	area.	In	order	to	
minimise	those	threats	and	make	the	most	out	of	the	post-
Brexit	situation	in	Mansfield,	policy-makers	may	want	to	take	
into consideration the following ideas:
80	 Interview	with	Matthew	Wheatley,	25	May	2018.
1. In	relation	to	the	issue	of	skills,	local	needs	for	foreign	
skilled	workers	should	be	assessed	and	taken	into	
consideration in the Brexit negotiations. At the same 
time, it is more urgent than ever that the authorities 
address the underlying challenge of increasing the 
skill	level	of	the	local	population,	both	by	improving	the	
local-level	availability	of	quality	training,	and	by	providing	
incentives	for	people	to	make	maximum	use	of	any	
available training opportunities.
2. Mansfield’s	past	experience	has	shown	that	development	
along a high value-added direction must be pursued 
purposely through appropriate policies for local 
development. Brexit could negatively affect the ability 
of the local authorities to continue their efforts in that 
direction, unless EU funding for regional development is 
fully replaced with national schemes. Such schemes may 
also be designed to incorporate some of the most positive 
aspects	of	the	EU’s	regional	development	programmes,	
such as continuity across time, and the empowerment of 
local	and	regional	stakeholders	through	the	devolution	of	
responsibility for policy design and implementation. 
3. Stakeholders	in	Mansfield	generally	recognise	the	positive	
effects of trading with EU countries for the local economy, 
and many are optimistic about the future as they consider 
it	unlikely	that	trade	with	the	EU	will	substantially	decline	
after	Brexit.	A	Brexit	deal	that	safeguards	the	trade	links	of	
local	companies	with	the	EU	would	be	highly	beneficial	for	
Mansfield’s	economy,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	sectors	
that	are	considered	strategically	important	for	Mansfield’s	
development, such as high-end business services.
4. Should the prices of basic goods, and particularly food, 
continue to increase as a result of Brexit, it would be 
good to put measures in place in order to minimise 
the impact of these changes on the most vulnerable 
members of the community.
Challenges ahead
In this report, we have taken stock of different types of opportunities and threats 
that will arise for the wider Mansfield economy as a result of Britain’s departure 
from the EU, in the context of a set of longer-term structural economic problems 
that Mansfield has faced since the late 1980s. 
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Sociodemographic/voting/economy
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Electorate in Brexit referendum Electoral Commission 223467 53400 77624 64534 158171 46500001
United 
Kingdom
Number of valid votes in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 161033 39742 56344 45335 107665 33551983
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting remain in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 62.2% 54.6% 29.1% 36.9% 46.2% 48.1%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage voting leave in Brexit 
referendum
Electoral 
Commission 37.8% 45.4% 70.9% 63.2% 53.8% 51.9%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for soft Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -1.2% -1.3%
United 
Kingdom
CEP estimate for hard Brexit effect 
(% of GVA) CEP -2.2% -1.5% -2.0% -1.4% -1.9% -2.7%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage of live births to mothers 
not born in the UK ONS 58.7% 11.1% 17.1% 28.9% 34.8% 26.9%
United 
Kingdom
Percentage non-British ONS 20.8% 4.0% 7.6% 6.7% 19.7% 9.3% United Kingdom
Percentage non UK born ONS 39.0% 6.7% 8.6% 8.9% 22.9% 14.1% United Kingdom
Percentage born in UK, 2011 2011 Census 61.1% 94.0% 94.4% 89.1% 82.4% 86.6% England and Wales
Percentage born in other EU 
countries, 2011 2011 Census 10.4% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 6.7% 4.3%
England and 
Wales
Percentage white UK born APS 45.5% 92.5% 86.8% 80.4% 74.8% 79.7% United Kingdom
Percentage white not UK born APS 19.4% 4.4% 6.2% 4.7% 11.8% 6.8% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority UK born APS 17.2% 0.9% 2.0% 6.4% 3.8% 6.5% United Kingdom
Percentage ethnic minority not UK born APS 18.0% 2.3% 5.0% 8.5% 9.6% 7.0% United Kingdom
Employment share: Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing BRES 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Mining, 
quarrying & utilities BRES 0.2% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Manufacturing BRES 2.3% 4.2% 9.8% 28.1% 3.4% 7.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Construction BRES 6.1% 5.8% 7.3% 4.7% 3.0% 4.7% Great Britain
Employment share: Motor trades BRES 1.3% 1.7% 2.4% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Wholesale BRES 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 3.9% 2.6% 3.9% Great Britain
Employment share: Retail BRES 11.4% 10.0% 12.2% 10.9% 9.4% 9.5% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Transport & storage (inc postal) BRES 3.0% 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 6.8% 4.8% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Accommodation & food services BRES 6.8% 13.3% 6.1% 7.0% 6.8% 7.4% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Information & communication BRES 4.5% 1.3% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 4.1% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Financial & insurance BRES 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.0% 3.5% Great Britain
Employment share: Property BRES 4.5% 1.5% 0.9% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% Great Britain
Employment share: 
Professional, scientific & technical BRES 11.4% 3.3% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 8.7% Great Britain
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Notes
Employment by ethnicity data is obtained from Nomis but is not included here due to space constraints
Electoral comission data for the EU referendum is available at https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-
elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information
The Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) paper is available at http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit10.pdf
The	ONS	migration	data	is	available	at:	https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/migrationwithintheuk/datasets/
localareamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom
Data from the Census, Annual Population Survey (APS), and Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) are available at Noms: https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
The Social Mobility Index is only available for England
ONS	regional	price	data	is	available	at:	https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/relativeregionalconsumerpricelevelsuk/2016 
House Price data is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/price-paid-data-downloads
Electoral	Comission	data	for	the	2015	and	2017	general	elections	is	available	at:	https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data/
electoral-data-files-and-reports
General election voting data is available at the parliamentary constituency level whereas this project focuses on local authorities. We impute local authority level data 
by	fitting	constituencies	into	local	authorities.	For	Ceredigion,	Mansfield	and	Pendle,	the	parliamentary	constituency	is	equivalent	to	the	local	authority.	Barnet	is	a	
combination of three parliamentary constituencies, namely: Finchley and Golders Green, Hendon, and Chipping Barnet. For these four local authorities there is no issue in 
obtaining local authority level general election data. Southampton is constructed of two full constituencies - Test and Itchen - and part of the constituency Romsey and 
Southampton North. To obtain general election data for Southampton, we use the population-weighted mean of the general election results for these constituencies. This 
requires	us	to	assume	that	the	voting	behaviour	of	voters	in	the	section	of	Romsey	and	Southampton	North	that	is	in	the	local	authority	Southampton	is	equivalent	to	the	
proportion	that	is	outside	of	Southampton	local	authority.	We	believe	that	this	is	a	reasonable	assumption.	Further,	it	only	affects	a	11.9%	of	the	Southampton	population,	
so	any	induced	error	is	likely	to	be	relatively	very	small.
Local Authority Data source Barnet Ceredigion Mansfield Pendle Southampton Country (countries included)
Employment share: Business 
administration & support services BRES 8.3% 2.0% 12.2% 4.7% 12.0% 8.8% Great Britain
Employment share: Public 
administration & defence BRES 3.4% 6.7% 4.3% 2.5% 4.3% 4.2% Great Britain
Employment share: Education BRES 11.4% 20.0% 8.5% 9.4% 12.0% 8.6% Great Britain
Employment share: Health BRES 15.2% 13.3% 14.6% 10.9% 17.1% 13.0% Great Britain
Employment share: Arts, entertainment, 
recreation & other services
BRES 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 2.5% 3.8% 4.6% Great Britain
Percentage with NVQ level 4+, 
aged 16-64
APS 54.0% 31.4% 17.5% 21.5% 36.0% 38.4% United 
Kingdom
Percentage with no qualifications, 
aged 16-64
APS 5.5% 7.6% 11.2% 9.1% 7.4% 8.0% United 
Kingdom
Population, 2017 APS 389,700 74,800 105,800 89,700 250,900 65,114,500 United 
Kingdom
Social Mobility Index 
(ranking out of 324)
Social 
Mobility Index
9 Not 
available
315 144 247 Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
49.5% 11.0% 28.2% 47.2% 39.7% 36.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage Labour
Electoral 
Commission
38.4% 9.7% 39.4% 34.9% 19.1% 30.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: 
Percentage UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
5.5% 10.2% 25.1% 12.2% 12.8% 12.6% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2015: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
68.0% 69.0% 60.9% 68.8% 63.4% 66.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Conservative
Electoral 
Commission
47.1% 18.4% 46.6% 49.0% 42.8% 42.4% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
Labour
Electoral 
Commission
45.2% 20.2% 44.5% 46.2% 47.7% 40.0% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Percentage 
UKIP
Electoral 
Commission
0.6% 1.5% 5.3% 0.0% 1.0% 1.8% United 
Kingdom
General Election 2017: Turnout Electoral 
Commission
70.5% 73.3% 64.5% 69.0% 67.1% 68.8% United 
Kingdom
Price level, 2016 
(regional, relative to UK index of 100)
ONS 107.2 98.1 99.6 98.8 101.5 100.0 United 
Kingdom
House price, 2017 
(mean transaction price)
Land Registry £691,914 £224,337 £148,961 £114,441 £268,534 £345,715 England and 
Wales
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Percentage decrease in local authority GVA: Hard Brexit 
(Dhingra et al. 2017)
Percentage decrease in local authority GVA: Soft Brexit 
(Dhingra et al. 2017)
Appendix 2: Post Brexit percentage decrease in local authority
Appendix 3: List of interviewees
Name Position Date, time Duration Type 
Jim Burley
LEADER	Programme	Officer	for	North	
Nottinghamshire
23/05/2018,	2pm 1h15min In person
Dominic Wring
Professor of Political Communication, 
Loughborough University
23/05/2018,	4pm 1 hour By telephone
Martin Rigley CEO,	Lindhurst	Engineering
24/05/2018,	9am 30 min In person
Brian Stopford
Director,	Stopford	Associates;	Board	Member,	
Mansfield	&	Ashfield	2020
Keith Barnes Packaging	consultant,	K.	B.	Consulting 24/05/2018,	9.30am 1 hour In person
Sue	Kirk Financial	Director,	Mansfield	Garage	Doors 24/05/2018,	2pm 1 hour In person
Matthew Wheatley CEO,	D2N2	LEP 25/05/2018,	10am 50	min In person
Andy Done-Johnson
Journalist,	Sheffield	Star	(until	the	start	of 
2018,	journalist	at	Mansfield	Chad	for	5	years)
25/05/2018,	3pm 2 hours In person
James Lowe CEO,	Brightbuster 29/05/2018,	12	noon 40 min By telephone
Ben Bradley MP	for	Mansfield 11/06/2018, 7pm 10 min By telephone
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Image 11: Waverley House, Old Market Cross, Mansfield
Acknowledgements
We are more than grateful to Keith Barnes, Ben Bradley, Jim Burley, Andy Done-
Johnson, Sue Kirk, James Lowe, Martin Rigley, Brian Stopford, Matthew Wheatley, 
and Dominic Wring, who devoted their time in order to be interviewed for this 
report. They shared their views with honesty and generosity, thereby contributing in 
a crucial way to our research. We would also like to thank the Mansfield & Ashfield 
2020 business consortium for warmly welcoming us in their community, and 
for facilitating several of the interviews that we conducted with representatives 
of local businesses. During the process of doing research for this report, we 
listened to a wide range of views about the likely impacts of Brexit at local level, 
but ultimately, the opinions expressed in this report reflect solely the views of the 
authors. Naturally, we also accept full responsibility for any errors and omissions.
22
Design: LSE Design Unit (lse.ac.uk/designunit).	Photography:	Wikimedia/Creative	Commons.
lse.ac.uk/ccs/brexit 
Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit
Department of International Development
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Email: id.ccs@lse.ac.uk
Tel:	+44	(0)	207	955	6419
Twitter: @LSE_CCS
